Protecting protected areas in bello: Learning from institutional design and conflict resilience in the Greater Virunga and Kidepo landscapes by Hsiao, E.
This is a repository copy of Protecting protected areas in bello: Learning from institutional 
design and conflict resilience in the Greater Virunga and Kidepo landscapes.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/163771/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Hsiao, E. (2020) Protecting protected areas in bello: Learning from institutional design and 
conflict resilience in the Greater Virunga and Kidepo landscapes. Goettingen Journal of 
International Law, 10 (1). pp. 67-110. ISSN 1868-1581 
https://doi.org/10.3249/1868-1581-10-1-hsiao
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
67Protecting Protected Areas in Bello
doi: 10.3249/1868-1581-10-1-hsiao
Goettingen Journal of International Law 10 (2020) 1, 67-110
*  Elaine (Lan Yin) Hsiao, Global Challenges Fellow, Sheield Institute for International 
Development, IUCN CEESP heme on Environment and Peace.
his contribution is licensed under the Creative Commons Licence Attribution – No Derivative 
Works 3.0 Germany and protected by German Intellectual Property Law (UrhG).
Protecting Protected Areas in Bello: Learning 
From Institutional Design and Conflict 
Resilience in the Greater Virunga and Kidepo 
Landscapes
Elaine (Lan Yin) Hsiao*
Table of Contents
A. Introduction ...........................................................................................70
B. Protecting Protected Areas From Armed Conlict...................................73
I. Protected Areas on the Frontlines .......................................................73
II. Not all Protected Areas are Created Equal: Qualifying as a
 Protected Zone ...................................................................................76
III. Holes in the Armor: Protection During Armed Conlict ................... 80
C. Transboundary Conservation in Africa’s Great Rift Valley .....................83
I. Notes on Methodology of Field Research .......................................... 84
II. Major Ecological and Cultural Importance ........................................85
III. Armed Conlicts in the TBPAs .......................................................... 86
IV. Institutionalizing Transboundary Cooperation .................................. 90
D. Lessons in Sustaining Transboundary Conservation in Places
 of Armed Conlict ................................................................................. 97
I. Engaging the Security Sector ............................................................. 97
II. Reaching Out to Other Partners for Conservation ...........................100
III. Bottom-up vs. Top-down Approaches to TBPA Design ....................101
E. Conclusion ...........................................................................................106
68 GoJIL 10 (2020) 1, 67-110
Abstract
It has often been cited that major armed conlicts (>1,000 casualties) alicted 
two-thirds (23) of the world’s recognized biodiversity hotspots between 1950 
and 2000.1 In 2011, the International Law Commission (ILC) included in its 
long-term work program Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conlict.2 his led to the adoption of twenty-eight Draft Principles, including 
designation of protected zones where attacks against the environment are 
prohibited during armed conlict.3 Protected zone designations apply to places 
of major environmental and cultural importance, requiring that they “[…] 
shall be protected against any attack, as long as it does not contain a military 
objective.”4 Most research on armed conlict and protected areas has focused on 
impacts to wildlife and less on how to protect these natural habitats from the 
ravages of armed conlict.5
his article highlights some of the gaps in the ILC Draft Principles towards 
protecting protected zones in bello. It uses transboundary protected areas 
(TBPAs) formalized through multilateral agreements to illustrate challenges 
on the ground. TBPAs are internationally designated “[...] protected areas that 
are ecologically connected across one or more international boundaries […]” 
and sometimes even established for their promotion of peace (i.e., Parks for 
Peace).6 here is little legal research on how to design TBPA agreements for 
1  T. Hanson et al., ‘Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots’, 23 Conservation Biology (2009) 3, 
578, 578.
2  Report of the International Law Commission to the Sixty-hird Session, UN Doc A/66/10, 
2011, 289.
3  ILC, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conlicts, Text and Titles of the 
Draft Principles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.937, 6 June 2019, Draft Principle 4.
4  Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, UN Doc A/74/10, 
2019, 213.
5  A. J. Plumptre, ‘Lessons Learned from On-the-Ground Conservation in Rwanda and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 16 Journal of Sustainable Forestry (2003) 3-4, 69-
88; J. H. Daskin & R. M. Pringle, ‘Warfare and Wildlife Declines in Africa’s Protected 
Areas’, 553 Nature (2018) 7688, 328-336; J. P. Dudley et al., ‘Efects of War and Civil 
Strife on Wildlife and Wildlife Habitats’, 16 Conservation Biology (2002) 2, 319-329.
6  M. Vasilijević et al., Transboundary Conservation: A Systematic and Integrated Approach 
(2015), available at https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/iles/documents/PAG-
023.pdf (last visited 17 March 2020).
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conlict resilience, conlict sensitivity, and ultimately positive peace.7 he 
research draws from two case studies in Africa’s Great Rift Valley: the Greater 
Virunga Landscape (GVL) between the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Rwanda, and Uganda, and the Kidepo Landscape, which forms part of 
the broader Landscapes for Peace initiative between South Sudan and Uganda. 
Both sufer from armed conlicts of various types and present two of the only 
TBPAs in the world that have incorporated environmental peacebuilding into 
their transboundary agreements.8 he case studies illustrate diferent approaches 
to TBPA design and the pros and cons of each modality in the context of 
conlict resilience and conlict sensitivity. his guides us on how to better protect 
protected areas in bello, ensuring that protected zones endure on the ground and 
not just in principle.
7  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Missing Peace: Why Transboundary Conservation Areas Are Not 
Resolving Conlicts’, News Security Beat (19 February 2019), available at https://
www.newsecuritybeat.org/2019/02/missing-peace-transboundary-conservation-areas-
resolving-conlicts/ (last visited 17 March 2020).
8  E. C. Hsiao, Protecting Places for Nature, People, and Peace: A Critical Socio-Legal Review of 
Transboundary Conservation Areas (2018), available at https://hdl.handle.net/2429/67561 
(last visited 17 March 2020).
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A. Introduction
Protected areas (PAs) are often considered the “cornerstone of biodiversity 
conservation”, relied upon to safekeep not only wildlife but also human security.9 
According to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
PAs are “[…] a clearly deined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and 
managed, through legal or other efective means, to achieve the long term 
conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values”.10 
Some, namely Parks for Peace, are also heralded for their potential to contribute 
to peace.11 he IUCN applies the term Parks for Peace to transboundary 
protected areas (TBPAs) specially “[…] dedicated to the promotion, celebration 
and/or commemoration of peace and cooperation”.12 hey deine TBPAs as 
“[…] a clearly deined geographical space that consists of protected areas that 
are ecologically connected across one or more international boundaries and 
involves some form of cooperation”.13 In other words, TBPAs are internationally 
designated PAs.
Work by the International Law Commission (ILC) on Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conlict has led to the adoption of twenty-
eight Draft Principles, including the designation of protected zones where attacks 
against the environment are prohibited during armed conlict.14 Protected zone 
designations apply to places of major environmental and cultural importance, 
9  K. Beazley & R. Baldwin, ‘Biodiversity and Protected Areas’, 8 Land (2019) ix. See 
Website of Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity Secretariat, Protected 
Areas, available at https://www.cbd.int/protected/ (last visited 17 March 2020); M. 
Deguignet et al., United Nations List of Protected Areas (2014) vi, available at https://wdpa.
s3.amazonaws.com/WPC2014/2014_UN_LIST_REPORT_EN.pdf (last visited 17 
March 2020); S. Stolton et al., ‘Values and Beneits of Protected Areas’, in G. L. Worboys 
et al. (eds), Protected Area Governance and Management (2015), 145; A. H. Westing, 
Transfrontier Reserves for Peace and Nature: A Contribution to Human Security (1993).
10  N. Dudley (ed.), Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (2008), 
8, available at https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/iles/documents/PAG-021.pdf 
(last visited 16 April 2020).
11  S. Ali, Peace Parks: Conservation and Conlict Resolution (2007), 7-10, 17; Westing, 
Transfrontier Reserves for Peace and Nature: A Contribution to Human Security, supra note 9.
12  Vasilijević et al., Transboundary Conservation: A Systematic and Integrated Approach, supra 
note 6, xi.
13  Ibid.
14  Report of the International Law Commission to the Sixty-hird Session, supra note 2, 289; 
ILC, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conlicts, Text and Titles of the 
Draft Principles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, supra note 
3, Draft Principle 4.
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requiring that they “[…] shall be protected against any attack, as long as it does 
not contain a military objective”.15 Commentary to the ILC Draft Principles 
note that internationally designated PAs by multilateral agreements may be 
recognized as protected zones.16 In principle, this includes TBPAs established 
through multilateral agreements. As noted by the Special Rapporteurs in their 
Introductory Note of this Special Issue, Draft Principle 4 on protected zones 
should enhance protection in bello. However, the vulnerability of international 
cooperation to armed conlict, the existence of “paper parks” that are legally 
designated yet inefective on the ground, and the frequent occurrence of 
protected areas downgrading, downsizing, and degazettement (PADDD) even 
in peacetime, indicate that the designation of protected status alone is not 
enough to safeguard the environment.17
he irst section of this article provides a critique of potential gaps in 
international law as captured by the ILC Draft Principles regarding protected 
zones and questions whether they suice to efectively protect PAs in bello. It 
identiies a number of weaknesses, namely the possibility that not all protected 
or conserved areas may qualify as protected zones when interpreting the ILC 
Draft Principles and that there is insuicient guidance on the active protection 
of protected zones in times of armed conlict. Ideally, all protected and 
conserved areas should by default be considered protected zones in relation to 
armed conlicts, but it is unlikely States will accept such a blanket protection, 
so we need to consider what is required to operationalize the protection of 
protected areas beyond just designation. In the second section, two case studies 
in diferent parts of Africa’s Great Rift Valley illustrate what may be needed 
institutionally and legally to sustain cooperation and conservation – two 
fundamental elements of ecological peacebuilding or the resolution of armed 
conlicts through collaborative environmental protection.
International cooperation through TBPAs elicits the potential for 
environmental peacebuilding or improved relations and even the resolution 
15  Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, 213.
16  Report of the International Law Commission to the Sixty-Eighth Session, UN Doc A/71/10, 2 
May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016, 327.
17  M. B. Mascia et al., ‘Protected Area Downgrading, Downsizing, and Degazettement 
(PADDD) in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, 1900-2010’, 169 
Biological Conservation (2013), 355-356; J. P. Rodriguez & K. M. Rodriguez-Clark, 
‘Even ‘Paper Parks’ Are Important’, 16 TRENDS in Ecology & Evolution (2001) 1, 17; 
Š. Waisová, ‘Environmental Cooperation as Instrument of Conlict Transformation in 
Conlict-Prone Areas: Where Does It Start, How Deep It Can Be and What Efects It 
Can Have’, Politické Vedy (2015) 2, 105, 118-119.
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of conlicts through shared natural resource management.18 Yet, evidence 
to this efect in TBPAs has been elusive, suggesting that they rely on pre-
existing international peace between States for formalization and ongoing non-
violent relations for continuity.19 TBPAs, including Parks for Peace, and the 
multi-stakeholder cooperation upon which they are premised are not conlict 
resilient.20 his vulnerability compromises TBPA protection in bello and its 
potential for environmental peacebuilding. Furthermore, TBPAs have been 
repeatedly criticized for alicting other violences and contributing to conlicts, 
including armed conlict,21 hence the need for conlict sensitivity in addition to 
conlict resilience.22 Conlict sensitive conservation should contribute to conlict 
resilience and, in turn, better protect protected zones in bello. In a TBPA, this 
facilitates ongoing cooperation that can contribute to broader environmental 
peacebuilding.
While the case studies present diferent issues and adaptations, their 
experiences, as discussed in section three, provide valuable lessons regarding 
engagement of the security sector and other partners in conservation. his 
teaches us something of how TBPA institutions and their objectives can prevail, 
even in places where negative peace is evasive. Only by ofering actual protection 
for PAs on the ground in bello can Draft Principles one day achieve enhanced 
protection for the environment in relation to armed conlict.
18  Ali, Peace Parks: A Conservation and Conlict Resolution, supra note 11, 7-10; K. Conca & 
G. D. Dabelko, Environmental Peacemaking (2002), 4-5, 9-11, 220, 223, 230.
19  K. Barquet, P. Lujala, & J. K. Rød, ‘Transboundary Conservation and Militarized 
Interstate Disputes’, 42 Political Geography (2014) 1, 1, 8-10; Waisová, ‘Environmental 
Cooperation as Instrument of Conlict Transformation in Conlict-Prone Areas: Where 
Does it Start, How Deep it Can Be and What Efects it Can Have’, supra note 17, 105, 
118-119.
20  T. Ide, ‘he Impact of Environmental Cooperation on Peacemaking: Deinitions, 
Mechanisms, and Empirical Evidence’, 21 International Studies Review (2018) 3, 327-346.
21  D. Brockington, Fortress Conservation: he Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, 
Tanzania (2002); M. Dowie, Conservation Refugees: he Hundred-Year Conlict Between 
Global Conservation and Native Peoples (2009); R. Dufy et al., ‘Why We Must Question 
the Militarisation of Conservation’, 232 Biological Conservation (2019), 66; J. Verweijen 
& E. Marijnen, ‘he Counterinsurgency/Conservation Nexus: Guerrilla Livelihoods 
and the Dynamics of Conlict and Violence in the Virunga National Park, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’, 45 he Journal of Peasant Studies (2016) 2, 300.
22  See A. Hammill et al., Conlict-Sensitive Conservation: Practitioners’ Manual (2009), 
available at https://www.iisd.org/library/conlict-sensitive-conservation-practitioners-
manual (last visited 17 March 2020).
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B. Protecting Protected Areas From Armed Conlict
I. Protected Areas on the Frontlines
Biodiversity everywhere is under threat from human activities, including 
land and forest conversion, pollution, over-exploitation, and armed conlict.23 
Major armed conlicts (>1,000 human casualties) alicted two-thirds (23 total) 
of the world’s recognized biodiversity hotspots between 1950 and 2000.24 
Although ten of the countries hosting biodiversity hotspots were untouched 
by major armed conlicts, they may have experienced conlicts of lesser scale.25 
Many of today’s armed conlicts do not rise to the level of major armed conlicts, 
but the sufering of both people and nature in these places is not dismissible.26 
Considering that PAs are intended to safeguard nature from human harms, it 
would be disappointing if these places were not protected from arguably the 
worst of human behaviors – armed conlict.
he impacts of armed conlict on PAs can be direct and indirect, resulting 
from targeted attacks, collateral damage or other, often less visible impacts 
linked to either of the former. Direct impacts (tactical pathways) include 
physical destruction or degradation of land, resources, or species, which can be 
intended tactics of war (e.g., ire-bombing forests) or collateral damage resulting 
from conlict activities (e.g., exploitation of wildlife for conlict-supporting 
revenues).27 Indirect impacts (non-tactical pathways) include the efects of 
conlict-displaced peoples (i.e., refugees and internally displaced people) and 
disruption or changes to institutional and economic systems.28 Although some 
claim that violent conlict can have the positive efect of keeping people and 
23  Hanson et al., ‘Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots’, supra note 1, 578; N. Myers, ‘hreatened 
Biotas: “Hotspots” in Tropical Forests’, 8 Environmentalist (1988) 3, 187; N. Myers et 
al., ‘Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities’, 403 Nature (2000) 853, 855-856; 
United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook 5: Summary for 
Policy Makers (2012) 20.
24  Hanson et al., ‘Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots’, supra note 1, 580.
25  Report of the International Law Commission to the Sixty-Eighth Session, supra note 16, 327.
26  K. Dupuy et al., Trends in Armed Conlict, 1946-2016, (2017) 4, at 2.
27  J. E. Austin & C. Bruch, he Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and 
Scientiic Perspectives (2000), 1-6; B. N. Bella, ‘A Survey of the ‘War on Wildlife’: How 
Conlict Afects Conservation’, New Security Beat, 3 April 2017, available at https://www.
newsecuritybeat.org/2017/04/survey-war-wildlife-conf (last visited 17 March 2020); S. V. 
Price, War and Tropical Forests: Conservation in Areas of Armed Conlict (2003).
28  Bella, ‘A Survey of the ‘War on Wildlife’: How Conlict Afects Conservation’, supra note 
27; K. M. Gaynor et al., ‘War and Wildlife: Linking Armed Conlict to Conservation’, 14 
Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment (2016) 10, 533.
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development out of PAs,29 thereby inadvertently safeguarding nature and even 
providing opportunity for ecological regeneration (e.g., forests in Colombia and 
the Demilitarized Zone between the Koreas), many of the efects are indisputably 
negative.30 PAs can become overwhelmed by displaced peoples, used for military 
cover and maneuvers, and PA staf may be recruited into armed forces, removed 
for their safety, or lose funding to maintain conservation activities.31 It is 
important, therefore, to sustain efective conservation in PAs during armed 
conlict, allowing them to play a positive role in post-conlict peace.
When it comes to protecting PAs from armed conlict, there is increasing 
experience on the ground, but little published guidance to draw upon. Most 
research on armed conlict and PAs has focused on impacts to wildlife and less 
on efective conservation practices, which I argue should be conlict resilient, 
conlict sensitive, and ideally, conlict-transformative or peacebuilding.32 
While the ILC Draft Principles call for enhanced protection of internationally 
designated PAs, there is little legal scholarship on how to designate such areas and 
design their agreements for conlict resilience, conlict sensitivity and ultimately, 
positive peace.33 Design in this case refers to
29  R. Burgess, E. Miguel & C. Stanton, ‘War and Deforestation in Sierra Leone’, 10 
Environmental Research Letters (2015) 9, 1, 6; K. C. Kim, ‘Preserving Biodiversity in 
Korea’s Demilitarized Zone’, 278 Science (1997) 5336, 242-243; J. Lelieveld et al., ‘Abrupt 
Recent Trend Changes in Atmospheric Nitrogen Dioxide over the Middle East’, 1 Science 
Advances (2015) 7, 1, 2.
30  Gaynor et al., ‘War and Wildlife: Linking Armed Conlict to Conservation’, supra note 28; 
P. Le Billon, Power Is Consuming the Forest: he Political Ecology of Conlict and Reconstruction 
in Cambodia (1999), 1, available at https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9dd5daa2-704c-
4909-850a-d4d64294cce3/download_ile?ile_format=pdf&safe_ilename=602330160.
pdf&type_of_work=hesis (last visited 17 March 2020); A. J. Plumptre, M. Masozera & 
A. Vedder, he Impact of Civil War on the Conservation of Protected Areas in Rwanda (2001), 
4-13.
31  J. Kalpers, Volcanoes under Siege: Impact of a Decade of Armed Conlict in the Virungas, BSP 
Case Studies (2001), 4-24; S. Kanyamibwa, ‘Impact of War on Conservation: Rwandan 
Environment and Wildlife in Agony’, 7 Biodiversity & Conservation (1998), 1399; de 
Merode et al., ‘he Impact of Armed Conlict on Protected-Area Eicacy in Central 
Africa’, 3 Biology Letters (2007) 3, 299; Plumptre, Masozera & Vedder, he Impact of Civil 
War on the Conservation of Protected Areas in Rwanda, supra note 30, at 1-25.
32  Plumptre, ‘Lessons Learned from On-the-Ground Conservation in Rwanda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ supra note 5, 69-88; Daskin & Pringle, ‘Warfare 
and Wildlife Declines in Africa’s Protected Areas’, supra note 5, 328-336; Dudley et al., 
‘Efects of War and Civil Strife on Wildlife and Wildlife Habitats’, supra note 5, 319-329.
33  Hsiao, ‘Missing Peace: Why Transboundary Conservation Areas Are Not Resolving 
Conlicts’, supra note 7. 
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“[…] the legal and governance framework which stipulates why a 
PA is being created, how it shall be constituted and governed, as 
well as who is responsible for speciic activities within the territory 
in order to achieve its goals or principles, and any other aspect of its 
constitution”.34
Even TBPAs designated under or in response to an international agreement 
(e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity or World Heritage Convention) need 
to determine context-appropriate formulations for cross-border institutional 
and governance arrangements. his is important for conlict resilience, as will 
follow in the two case studies. Oftentimes, these arrangements are captured in 
multilateral or transboundary agreements (e.g., Memorandum of Understanding 
or MoU establishing a TBPA).35 his article is intended to provide insights into 
what TBPA agreements or designations should incorporate in order to sustain 
conservation in bello.
TBPAs are an idealized solution for species and ecosystems requiring 
connectivity (i.e., territory and freedom of movement) unhindered by political 
or human divides.36 Parks for Peace attribute another value to transboundary 
conservation – peace – or the possibility that cooperation can triumph over the 
self-interests of States.37 Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park between 
Canada and the United States, for example, celebrates friendly relations between 
those two States.38 La Cordillera del Condor helped resolve a long-time border 
34  Hsiao, Protecting Places for Nature, People, and Peace: A Critical Socio-Legal Review of 
Transboundary Conservation Areas, supra note 8, 4.
35  See for example, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Rwanda and Republic of 
Uganda, Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration Treaty on Wildlife Conservation and 
Tourism Development (GVTCT), 30 October 2015; Hsiao, Protecting Places for Nature, 
People, and Peace: A Critical Socio-Legal Review of Transboundary Conservation Areas, supra 
note 8, 121-129, 136.
36  Vasilijević et al., Transboundary Conservation: A Systematic and Integrated Approach, supra 
note 6, xi.
37  R. Lejano, ‘Peace Games: heorizing About Transboundary Conservation’, in S. H. Ali 
(ed.), Peace Parks: Conservation and Conlict Resolution (2007), 41, 41.
38  National Park Service and Parks Canada, Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
National Park Service of the Department of the Interior of the United States of America and 
Parks Canada of the Government of Canada, on Cooperation in Management, Research, 
Protection, Conservation, and Presentation of National Parks and National Historic Sites (May 
1998), available at http://www.watertonglacierpeacepark.org/history.html (last visited 16 
April 2020).
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dispute between Ecuador and Peru.39 Some TBPAs have aspirations for peace 
exactly because they still experience violent conlict (e.g., the Greater Virunga 
Landscape).40 In conlict-alicted TBPAs, sustained conservation safeguards 
resources that can contribute towards a peaceful future, hence this article focuses 
on TBPAs and their protection in bello.
II. Not all Protected Areas are Created Equal: Qualifying as a   
 Protected Zone
Some international humanitarian laws ofer protection for natural 
environments in armed conlict, notably:
1. Prohibitions against widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment [Arts. 35(3) and 55(1) of Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions (1977); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) of Rome Statute; Art. 1 of the 
ENMOD Convention]41
2. Protection of forests and vegetation from incendiary attacks [Protocol 
III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons]42
39  S. Ali, ‘A Casualty of Peace? Lessons on De-Militarizing Conservation in the Cordillera 
Del Condor Corridor’, in T. Lookingbill & P. Smallwood, Collateral Values of Natural 
Capital (2018), 177-188; Government of Peru and Government of Ecuador, ‘Peace, 
Friendship, and Boundaries Between Peru and Ecuador Protocol Between Peru and 
Ecuador (Translation)’, 29 January 1942, available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/
peacemaker.un.org/iles/Rio%20Protocol%20English%201942.pdf (last visited 18 
March 2020).
40  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Fidele Ruzigandekwe, Deputy Director of Programs of 
Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration Executive Secretariat’ (2017). All cited 
interviews were conducted by the author.
41  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conlicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [Protocol 
I]; Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modiication Techniques, 18 May 1977, 1108 UNTS 151 [ENMOD Convention]; Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9. 
42  United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Efects, 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), 27 
October 1980, UN Doc A/CONF.95/15.
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3. Care taken to protect and preserve the natural environment from 
hostilities not of military necessity [ICRC on Rules of Customary 
International Humanitarian Law]43
A few non-binding multilateral environmental texts express a general 
principle that natural environments should be protected from warfare (e.g., 
Principles 24 & 25 of the Rio Declaration).44 hese have all been echoed by 
the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of 
the hreat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.45 International laws protecting natural 
environments in relation to armed conlict do not, however, speciically mention 
PAs. his makes the ILC’s Draft Principles addressing protected zones potentially 
important.
While PAs certainly qualify as natural environments, there is no existing 
mandate that, at minimum, all protected or conserved areas must be spared 
when it comes to armed conlicts. he 2019 commentary accompanying the 
ILC Draft Principles says particular weight should be given to areas of “[…] 
major environmental and cultural importance […]”.46 While PAs, by IUCN 
deinition, are designated for their environmental values, they may not equate 
to major environmental importance. here is no universally accepted standard 
for major environmental importance. Some organizations use the terminology 
“biodiversity hotspots”, which are typically based on a minimum threshold of 
species diversity (e.g., at least 1,500 endemic vascular plants) and signiicant 
levels of threat (i.e., has already lost 70% or more of its natural vegetation).47 
43  J.-M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005), 
available at https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/iles/other/customary-international-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf (last visited 22 April 2020), Rules 43-45; International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions 
on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conlict’, 301 International 
Review of the Red Cross (1996), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
article/other/57jn38.htm (last visited 27 April 2020).
44  Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 12 August 
1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 [Rio Declaration on Environment and Development]; 
GA Res. 37/7, UN Doc A/RES/37/7, 20 October 1982.
45  Legality of the hreat of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 
226, 241-243, para. 27-32.
46  Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, 211.
47  R. A. Mittermeier et al., ‘Global Biodiversity Conservation: he Critical Role of 
Hotspots’, in F. E. Zachos & J. C. Habel (eds), Biodiversity Hotspots: Distribution and 
Protection of Conservation Priority Areas (2011), 5-7; Myers et al., ‘Biodiversity Hotspots for 
Conservation Priorities’, supra note 23, 853-857.
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Others refer to “key biodiversity areas”, which are based more on an area’s 
contribution to the persistence of threatened species, broader ecological 
integrity, and biological processes.48 World Heritage Sites are the ILC’s most 
mentioned protected zone of major environmental importance, yet there are 
only 197 World Heritage Sites compared to 242,423 PAs in the World Database 
on Protected Areas maintained by UN Environment’s World Conservation 
Monitoring Centre.49 his Database has only begun to capture all of the areas 
and territories conserved by indigenous peoples and local communities (ICCAs), 
private PAs, and Other Efective Area-Based Conservation Measures (OECMs) 
– all worthy of protection in bello.50 PAs distinguish themselves from other 
natural environments by their designation, indicating the importance of their 
conservation, but the ILC’s repeated mention of only a small subset of PAs (i.e., 
World Heritage Sites) in the commentary could be interpreted by States to imply 
a hierarchy of importance and thereby protection in relation to armed conlict.
Cultural importance is another vague concept in the ILC Draft Principles. 
he 2019 ILC commentary on Draft Principle 4 explicitly recognizes ancestral 
lands and sacred areas of indigenous peoples as protected zones.51 ICCAs it 
squarely within this environment-culture linkage, but do privately protected 
areas or nationally designated areas without indigenous cultural value? Many 
nationally gazetted or privately protected areas emphasize ecological values; 
their social interests may have more to do with permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, aesthetic and recreational values, or inancial beneits. Is that 
48  International Union for the Conservation of Nature, ‘A Global Standard for the 
Identiication of Key Biodiversity Areas’ (2016), vi, available at https://portals.iucn.org/
library/node/46259 (last visited 18 March 2020).
49  Report of the International Law Commission to the Sixty-Eighth Session, supra note 16, 
324; Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, supra note 
4, 222-223; Special Rapporteur M. G. Jacobsson, Second Report on the Protection of the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conlicts, UN Doc A/CN.4/685, 28 May 2015, 69-70; 
UN Environment World Conservation Monitoring Centre & International Union for 
Conservation of Nature, ‘Protected Planet Report’ (2019), available at https://livereport.
protectedplanet.net (last visited 18 March 2020).
50  S. T. Garnett et al., ‘A Spatial Overview of the Global Importance of Indigenous Lands 
for Conservation’, 1 Nature Sustainability (2018) 7, 369, 369-370; Indigenous and 
Community Conserved Areas Registry, ‘ICCA Registry’ (2020), available at www.
iccaregistry.org (last visited 18 March 2020); H. Jonas et al., ‘New Steps of Change: 
Looking Beyond Protected Areas to Consider Other Efective Area Based Conservation 
Measures’, 20 PARKS (2014) 2, 111, 112-114; S. Stolton, K. H. Redford & N. Dudley, 
he Futures of Privately Protected Areas (2014), 21-23.
51  Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, 223.
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the cultural importance envisioned by the ILC? Does its ecological importance 
to humans amount to cultural value? ILC comments refer to the inherent 
connection between environmental and cultural importance recognized in 
international agreements (e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, World 
Heritage Convention), meaning the nature of cultural value (e.g., economic vs. 
ancestral) may not be important for the designation of protected zones, but this 
is unclear.52
In the interest of protecting all PAs all the time, all de jure or de facto 
protected or conserved areas ought to be, by default, protected zones in relation 
to armed conlict. Clearly, certain authorities have deemed them important 
enough to delineate them for the purposes of conservation and these protections 
should be respected and upheld against the negative impacts of armed conlict. 
It could otherwise be confusing for parties to armed conlict to distinguish 
between PAs that are protected zones and those that are not. Ignorance would 
be an unfortunate excuse for wartime destruction. Blanket recognition of all 
PAs as protected zones can also prevent confusion regarding nuances in PA 
designation and avoid hierarchies of environmental and cultural importance, 
which can be very subjective. Future comments on the Draft Principles should 
also address the status of international jurisdictions, which are also supposed to 
be devoted to peaceful uses (e.g., high seas and the poles).53
he distinction between a protected zone (Draft Principle 4), a protected 
zone protected in bello (Draft Principle 17), and the generally protected 
environment (Draft Principle 13) is important because it connotes diferent 
levels of protection for nature in relation to armed conlict. General protection 
of the environment expressed in Draft Principle 13 declares that “[n]o part of the 
natural environment may be attacked, unless it has become a military objective” 
but protected zones potentially go further by stating that they “[…] shall be 
protected against any attack [...]”. his signals a responsibility to protect, not just 
a duty to refrain. ILC comment on Draft Principle 17 states that the designation 
of a protected zone serves to enhance protection ofered in Draft Principle 13, 
airming a higher duty for protected zones.54
Like PAs, not all protected zones are created equal. In fact, Draft Principle 
17’s in bello enhanced protection of protected zones only applies to areas that 
52  Ibid., 221-224.
53  he Antarctic Treaty, 1 December 1959, Preamble, Art. 1, 402 UNTS 71; United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Preamble, Art. 141 & 301, 1833 
UNTS 397.
54  Ibid., 260.
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have been designated by agreement, even though Draft Principle 4 says that 
protected zones can be designated by agreement or otherwise.55 his makes 
protected zones established by agreement, broadly interpreted to include “[…] 
mutual as well as unilateral declarations accepted by the other party, treaties 
and other types of agreements, as well as agreements with non-State actors 
[…]” particularly important.56 TBPAs designated by cross-border agreements 
between State parties should fall within this remit, but the Draft Principles and 
their comments do not clarify how the designation should be stipulated. If the 
existence of an international agreement alone is suicient for in bello protection, 
are States prepared to take on active protection of these zones during armed 
conlict? Will existing TBPAs be grandfathered in, even if this kind of protection 
was not envisioned at the time of agreement? Ongoing armed conlicts in TBPAs 
with international agreements indicate that agreements alone are not enough.
III. Holes in the Armor: Protection During Armed Conlict
As is common in international law and humanitarian law, the ILC Draft 
Principles rely heavily on the good behavior and promise-keeping of State parties 
(pacta sunt servanda). his can become problematic in at least two contexts: 
indigenous territories and TBPAs. Paragraph 6 of the 2019 ILC comments on 
Draft Principle 5 notes that States should ensure that military activities do not 
take place within indigenous territories and they can do so by designating them 
as protected zones.57 his ignores the self-determination of indigenous peoples 
by calling on States to designate indigenous territories as protected zones. ILC 
commentary to Draft Principle 4 notes that protected zone agreements can be 
with non-State actors or through an international organization, but this implies 
that a State must be party and/or relegates the representative institutions of 
indigenous nations to the categories of non-State actors or international 
organizations, which demeans indigenous sovereignty.58
Asking States to take appropriate measures in consultation and cooperation 
with indigenous peoples, through their own leadership and representative 
structures, assumes rather naively that all States recognize the existence, 
55  ILC, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conlicts, Text and Titles of the 
Draft Principles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, supra note 
3, Draft Principle 4[I-(x), 5].
56  Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, 260, 
Draft Principle 17 (1).
57  Ibid., 226.
58  Ibid., 222.
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authority, and territories of all indigenous peoples in the world.59 Requiring 
States and other wartime actors (e.g., private security forces) to recognize and 
protect indigenous territories in bello, when priorities of national security and 
military necessity dominate, may be asking too much. It can also aggravate 
conlicts around competing systems of indigenous leadership and representation 
(e.g., State-determined tribal representation vs. traditional governance systems 
of indigenous peoples). As the Kidepo case study will indicate, indigenous and 
traditional communities can be efective in protecting natural environments 
and resolving conlicts. Conlict sensitivity and resilience requires that this 
potential not be undermined through the dilution of indigenous sovereignty or 
self-determined representation.
he protection of TBPAs in bello is precarious for other reasons. Waisova’s 
article on “Environmental cooperation as instrument of conlict transformation 
in conlict-prone areas” and a survey of TBPA practitioners I conducted in 2017 
emphasize the challenges of sustaining transboundary cooperation in times of 
armed conlict.60 As TBPA agreements give no indication that they do not apply 
during armed conlicts, breakdowns in cross-border conservation could result in 
material breaches of the agreements upon which a TBPA’s protected zone status 
resides.61 he same could be said for the cessation of conservation activities due 
to the occupation of a portion of the PA by security forces.62 ILC comments to 
Draft Principle 17 speciically state that military presence would cause in bello 
protections to cease.63 he ease with which Draft Principle 17’s protection could 
fall away is troubling for TBPAs, which often draw on military support during 
times of insecurity or are managed by paramilitary ranger forces.
Cooperation typically underpins international designation of PAs and 
TBPAs, yet the ILC Draft Principles’ only mentions of cooperation are: 
59  ILC, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conlicts, Text and Titles of the 
Draft Principles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, supra note 
3, Draft Principle 5.
60  Waisová, ‘Environmental Cooperation as Instrument of Conlict Transformation in 
Conlict-Prone Areas’, supra note 17, 105-126.
61  Based on the author’s 2017 review of 56 TBPA agreements. Hsiao, Protecting Places for 
Nature, People, and Peace: A Critical Socio-Legal Review of Transboundary Conservation 
Areas, supra note 8, 121-187.
62  Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, 260.
63  Ibid.
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1. Draft Principle 5: States to cooperate with indigenous peoples’ 
leadership and representative institutions regarding protection or 
remediation of indigenous territories;
2. Draft Principle 24: States or international organisation to cooperate 
in good faith in sharing or granting access to information vital to 
national defense or security;
3. Draft Principle 25: cooperation among relevant actors on post-conlict 
environmental assessments and remedial measures; and
4. Draft Principle 28: States and relevant international organizations to 
cooperate in ensuring remnants of war at sea do not endanger the 
environment.64
hese Draft Principles potentially miss the diverse network of cooperation 
required to sustain conservation in bello; for example, humanitarian and 
development organizations, as well as traditional and faith-based leaders. It 
also does not identify the legal responsibilities of States engaging with non-
State or non-military State actors, including armed groups and paramilitary 
ranger forces operating in PAs. In places like the Greater Virunga Landscape 
and Kidepo Landscape, complex relations between State and non-State armed 
groups require extreme conlict sensitivity and unconventional approaches to 
conservation.
It is well known amongst local conservationists that, in 2008, when Laurent 
Nkunda’s rebel group, the Congrès National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), 
took over the Mikeno sector of Virunga National Park on the Congo-side of 
the Greater Virunga Landscape, they continued mountain gorilla conservation 
and even tourism.65 At the end of 2018, exiled park management (technically 
contracted to an NGO) negotiated with Nkunda and his forces to allow rangers 
to return to the area.66 If this would have constituted an international armed 
conlict, these responsibilities may fall under Draft Principle 20 on Occupying 
64  ILC, Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conlicts, Text and Titles of the 
Draft Principles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on First Reading, supra note 
3, Draft Principles 5 [6], 24 [18], 25 [15] & 28 [17].
65  Based on anonymous interviews during ield research in 2010-2011 and 2016-2017.; H. 
homas & G. Nienaber, ‘Interview with General Laurent Nkunda’ (2009), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9tiu-1ig58&feature=related (last visited 18 March 
2020).
66  N.N., ‘Gorilla Warfare’, he Sydney Morning Herald (4 January 2009), available at 
https://www.smh.com.au/world/gorilla-warfare-20090104-gdt8lz.html (last visited 18 
March 2020).
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Powers, but that does not consider relations between NGOs, rangers, and rebels, 
which delicately negotiated the future of critically endangered mountain gorillas. 
In other parts of the Virunga, local communities negotiate rights of access and 
use of natural resources with armed groups (e.g., Mai Mai militias regulating 
isheries in Lake Edward) in order to sustain livelihoods.67 hese negotiated 
agreements are critical to the well-being of species and habitats during armed 
conlict, but it is uncertain where they sit within the ILC Draft Principles, in 
particular given that this concerns a non-international armed conlict. Generally, 
there is little guidance on conservation partnerships with armed forces, both in 
capacity-building/training and in law or policy, including TBPA agreements.68
Lack of diverse agency in conservation in bello can undermine 
conservation objectives, play into social conlicts and criticisms deriving 
from the exclusive nature of PAs (especially where a history of PA-induced 
displacement or disenfranchisement remains unreconciled), and displaces 
indigenous self-determination and/or endogenous approaches to conlict 
resolution and peacebuilding. As the two case studies will demonstrate, these 
are key considerations for conlict resilient, conlict sensitive, and conlict-
transformative conservation in places of armed conlict.
C. Transboundary Conservation in Africa’s Great Rift   
 Valley
When the IUCN irst proposed a deinition of Parks for Peace, it considered 
these places a “[…] particular sub-set of protected areas where there is a clear 
biodiversity objective, a clear peace objective and co-operation between at least 
two countries or sub-national jurisdictions”.69 he updated deinition refers to 
Parks for Peace as a “[…] special designation […] dedicated to the promotion, 
celebration and/or commemoration of peace and cooperation”.70 his efectively 
transforms peace from a clear objective of transboundary conservation to a 
symbolic designation. Perhaps this retreat from a stronger position on TBPAs 
67  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Congolese Conservationist, Goma 16 Feb 2017’ (2017).
68  L. Braack et al., Security Considerations in the Planning and Management of 
Transboundary Conservation Areas (2006), 5, available at http://www.tbpa.net/docs/pdfs/
Securityconsiderationsintransboundary.pdf (last visited 18 March 2020).
69  T. Sandwith et al., Transboundary Protected Areas for Peace and Co-Operation (2001), 4, 
available at http://web.bf.uni-lj.si/students/vnd/knjiznica/Skoberne_literatura/gradiva/
zavarovana_obmocja/IUCN_TBPA.pdf (last visited 18 March 2020).
70  Vasilijević et al., Transboundary Conservation: A Systematic and Integrated Approach, supra 
note 6, 14.
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and peace is related to lack of evidence that TBPAs can and are impacting 
positively on peace and conlict in violent borderlands.71 his section looks at 
how two TBPAs address conlicts with a common vision towards regional peace. 
he case studies illustrate the challenges and needs of sustained transboundary 
cooperation, an act which can protect the status of PAs involved and ideally 
supports broader peacebuilding. At the end of the day, de facto protection of PAs 
in bello is more important than de jure protected zone status, but the hope is that 
de jure protected zones will lead to efective de facto protection in bello.
I. Notes on Methodology of Field Research
he case studies that follow provide a brief description of the bioregion, a 
simpliied landscape of conlict issues, a history of transboundary collaboration, 
and an overview of the legal frameworks. All of the interviews cited were 
conducted in both the Greater Virunga Landscape and Kidepo Landscape, 
primarily between December 2016 and May 2017. he Kidepo Landscape is 
actually one of four sub-TBPAs that constitute the Landscapes for Peace initiative 
between South Sudan and Uganda. Due to time and resource constraints, visits 
to other parts of the Landscapes for Peace were restricted and, due to insecurity 
in South Sudan, only Kidepo Valley National Park (Uganda) of the Kidepo 
Landscape was covered. More ield time was spent in the Greater Virunga 
Landscape, where transboundary collaboration is more active than in Kidepo 
Valley National Park (NP).72
Field research was based on observation and semi-informal interviews 
with PA managers and staf, namely in the Law Enforcement, Community 
Conservation, and Research and Monitoring departments. Other interviewed 
stakeholders include security oicers (military, police, intelligence), local 
government representatives (village-level and district-level), NGOs engaged in 
transboundary activities, academics, and Community-Based Organizations 
(CBOs). he Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration (GVTC) Executive 
Secretariat was very helpful in providing a number of contacts and access to 
transboundary meetings.
71  Barquet, Lujala & Rød, ‘Transboundary Conservation and Militarized Interstate 
Disputes’, supra note 19; Hsiao, ‘Missing Peace: Why Transboundary Conservation Areas 
Are Not Resolving Conlicts’, supra note 7; Waisová, ‘Environmental Cooperation as 
Instrument of Conlict Transformation in Conlict-Prone Areas’, supra note 17, 105-126.
72  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with WCS Uganda, Country Director, Kampala, Uganda, 7 
December 2016’ (2016); A. J. Plumptre, ‘E-Mail from Andy Plumptre, WCS Albertine 
Rift Programme’ (2016). 
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Communities that were bordering both the TBPA and international 
boundary were visited for a better understanding of cross-border social dynamics 
and conlicts, and to identify traditional conlict resolution mechanisms. In PA 
communities, the Community Conservation Wardens served as liaisons to other 
interviewees, providing contacts and sometimes coordinating meetings, which 
when needed were translated on-site by a Community Conservation Ranger. 
Interviews involving local languages were transcribed but not translated due to 
resource limitations. he implications are that my understanding of interviewee 
responses is based entirely on rangers’ translations during the time of interview 
and may be misinterpreted or biased, especially given the inluence of a ranger’s 
presence on interviewees’ comfort or willingness to speak freely. As much as 
possible, information is further conirmed through secondary literature, media 
publications, or other interviews.
II. Major Ecological and Cultural Importance
he Great Rift Valley encompasses the West (Albertine) Rift Valley and 
East (Kenya/Gregory) Rift Valley.73 In the heart of the Albertine Rift is the 
Greater Virunga Landscape between DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. In the heart 
of the Gregory Rift is the series of smaller TBPAs or Landscapes for Peace 
between South Sudan and Uganda. One of these is the Kidepo Landscape, 
which also sits near the border of northern Kenya. Africa’s Great Rift Valley 
is a key region to highlight for a number of reasons. Naturally, it is one of the 
most biodiverse regions of the world and, in terms of violence and conlict, 
possibly one of the most threatened.74 It is considered a biodiversity hotspot and 
hosts numerous key biodiversity areas, as well as World Heritage Sites (Bwindi 
Impenetrable, Rwenzori Mountains, and Virunga National Parks).75 Most of its 
PAs are marked by porous borders where species, including people, move back 
and forth somewhat regardless of where military and customs posts are located.
73  A. Seimon & A. J. Plumptre, ‘Albertine Rift, Africa’, in J. A. Hilty, C. C. Chester & M. S. 
Cross (eds), Climate and Conservation: Landscape and Seascape Science, Planning and Action 
(2012), 33, 33.
74  K. Omeje & T. Redeker Hepner, ‘Introduction’, in K. Omeje & T. Redeker Hepner (eds), 
Conlict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region (2013), 1; A. Plumptre et al., 
‘he Biodiversity of the Albertine Rift’, 3 Albertine Rift Technical Reports (2003), 102-103.
75  Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration, Transboundary Collaboration in the 
Greater Virunga Landscape Protected Area Network: Transboundary Strategic Plan 2013-2018 
(2014), available at http://www.greatervirunga.org/IMG/pdf/transboundary_strategic_
plan_2feb16.pdf (last visited 18 March 2020); Plumptre et al., ‘he Biodiversity of the 
Albertine Rift’ supra note 74, Preface.
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he Greater Virunga Landscape was divided by the British and Belgians at 
the 1894 Conference of Berlin between DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda.76 he peak 
of Mount Sabinyo marks the trinational jurisdictions of the Virunga Massif. 
his water tower hosts over 400 endemic species and at least 70 threatened 
species in one of the world’s most resource rich landscapes, featuring oil and gas 
reserves, precious metals (e.g., gold, rare earth, coltan), and fertile agricultural 
land.77 he Landscapes for Peace appear as four islands straddling a border 
infamous for its stories of violence, famine, and child soldiers.78 It hosts some 
of the last remaining natural woodland patches and important wetlands for 
human and other populations.79 Nimule funnels the White Nile River, tracing 
back to Lakes Albert and Victoria, while the Imatong and Didinga Mountains 
form a watershed between the Nile and Congo river systems.80 Kidepo Valley, 
speciically, is an attractive wildlife destination because the Narus Valley provides 
a perennial water source and open gathering space for a diversity of species.81
III. Armed Conlicts in the TBPAs
he socio-political context of the Greater Virunga Landscape and 
Kidepo Landscape are complex and vary from village to village, as well as 
from landscape to landscape, but they share at least a few common factors: 
(1) ongoing armed conlicts impacting PAs; (2) transboundary agreements 
that address armed conlicts and environmental peacebuilding; and (3) human 
populations characterized by natural resource-dependent subsistence livelihoods 
76  I. Griiths, ‘he Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries’, 152 he Geographic 
Journal (1986) 2, 204, 204.
77  Plumptre et al., ‘he Biodiversity of the Albertine Rift’, supra note 74, 25; W. Okumu, 
‘Resources and Border Disputes in Eastern Africa’, 4 Journal of Eastern African Studies 
(2010) 2, 279, 279-297.
78  M. Fekadu Mulugeta, ‘Small Arms and Conlict among East African Pastoralists: 
he Karamoja (In)Security Complex’, 87 Africa (2017) 4, 739, 741; Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Government of Southern Sudan and the Government of Uganda 
On the Management of Transboundary Conservation Landscapes for Peace, 5 March 2007 
(on ile with author); B. Knighton, ‘Belief in Guns and Warlords: Freeing Karamojong 
Identity From Africanist heory’, 4 African Identities (2006) 2, 269, 269-271.
79  United Nations Development Programme, Launching Protected Area Network Management 
and Building Capacity in Post-Conlict Southern Sudan, July 2010, ii. 
80  Ibid., 7.
81  Uganda Wildlife Authority, ‘Kidepo Valley National Park: Park at a Glance’ (2018), 
available at http://ugandawildlife.org/explore-our-parks/parks-by-name-a-z/kidepo-
valley-national-park (last visited 18 March 2020).
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and economic poverty, and deemed a threat to PAs and peace.82 As two separate 
landscapes, they have long been connected through regional politics as well as 
ancient wildlife and transhumance migrations. In some places, ethnic groups 
share relations across borders (e.g., the Bakonzo and Banyarwanda); in others, 
they inter-raid (e.g., Karamojong, Dading’a, Jie, and Dodoth between South 
Sudan and Uganda).83
Many of the TBPA-adjacent communities share a story of conservation 
induced displacement as colonial administrators gazetted forest, hunting, and 
wildlife reserves and independent post-colonial States asserted permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources through paramilitary institutionalization of 
reserves turned national parks.84 At times, contingents of formerly displaced 
local identity-based groups have occupied or encroached PA lands and resources 
in direct conlict with central governments or PA authorities. For example, the 
Allied Democratic Forces – National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-
NALU) rebel forces, who took over the Rwenzori Mountains and traicked 
minerals and ivory amongst other illicit goods.85 he ADF-NALU were allegedly 
82  Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration, ‘Greater Virunga Landscape Annual 
Conservation Status Report 2015’ (2017), 8-12; A. Plumptre et al., ‘he Socio-Economic 
Status of People Living Near Protected Areas in the Central Albertine Rift’, 4 Albertine 
Rift Technical Reports (2004), 132; United Nations Development Programme, Launching 
Protected Area Network Management and Building Capacity in Post-Conlict Southern Sudan, 
supra note 79.
83  J. Lef, ‘Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border 
Region’, 3 International Journal of Conlict and Violence (2009) 2, 188, 190; G. Prunier, 
From Genocide to Continental War: he ‘Congolese’ Conlict and the Crisis of Contemporary 
Africa (2011), 82-83.
84  D. Hart-Davis, ‘Let Us Never Go the Way of the Ik’, he Independent (20 August 1994), 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/country-matters-let-us-never-go-the-
way-of-the-ik-1384655.html (last visited 18 March 2020); M. Matovu, ‘Land Injustice 
for the Basongora’, Minority Voices Newsroom, 20 June 2012, available at http://www.
minorityvoices.org/news.php?action=view&id=1140 (last visited 18 March 2020); L. A. 
Young & K. Sing’Oei, ‘Land, Livelihoods and Identities: Inter-Community Conlicts 
in East Africa’ (2011), 48, available at http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/
old-site-downloads/download-1076-Land-livelihoods-and-identities-Inter-community-
conlicts-in-East-Africa.pdf (last visited 18 March 2020).
85  S. Hege et al., Letter Dated 12 October 2012 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established 
Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN 
Doc S/2012/843, 15 November 2012, 44, 23; K. Hofman, ‘Myths Set in Motion: he 
Moral Economy of Mai Mai Governance’, in A. Arjona, N. Kasir & Z. Mampilly 
(eds), Rebel Governance in Civil War (2015), 158, 163; K. Hofman, K. Vlassenroot & 
G. Marchais, ‘Taxation, Stateness and Armed Groups: Public Authority and Resource 
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recruited by President Mobutu (DRC) to destabilize the Ugandan border 
and, while taking refuge in the DRC, liaised with Sudanese intelligence and 
security forces supplying Hutu militia or genocidaires in Rwanda.86 he Hutu 
genocidaires, often known as Interhamwe or the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), are still cited by villagers and security personnel 
in the Greater Virunga as a threat to security and peace.87
Other ethnically-identiied militias also engage in poaching, resource 
traicking, and armed conlicts, including with PA authorities.88 he Mai-Mai, 
for example, occupy the central sector of Virunga National Park and largely 
derive their income from local communities in the territories they control.89 
he name Mai-Mai refers to “[…] resistance ighters who are invincible 
[…]” and many of them “[…] are formed on an ethnic basis to protect their 
communities from ‘invasion’ or domination by other ethnic groups […]” but 
Extraction in Eastern Congo’, 47 Development and Change (2016) 6, 1434, 1441; 
International Criminal Police Organisation & United Nations Environment, ‘Strategic 
Report: Environment, Peace and Security - A Convergence of hreats’ (2016), available 
at https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/17008/environment_peace_
security.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (last visited 18 March 2020); M. Kavira Luneghe, 
‘Armed Groups at DRC’s Lake Edward Devastate Fish Stocks, Jobs and Farms’, Global 
Press Journal (6 September 2017), available at https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/
democratic-republic-of-congo/armed-groups-drcs-lake-edward-devastate-ish-stocks-
jobs-farms/ (last visited 20 March 2020); J. Kule Bitswande, ‘Kasese – a Tragic Conlict 
Rooted in Land, One Boy’s Dream and a Family’s Hope’, he Observer (3 March 2017), 
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201703030450.html (last visited 18 March 2020).
86  Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War: he ‘Congolese’ Conlict and the Crisis of 
Contemporary Africa, supra note 83, 86-87.
87  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Village Leader, Kimitoni Village, 14 February 2017’ (2017); 
E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with FARDC Liaison to Virunga National Park in Rumangabo, 
Goma 16 February 2017’ (2017); E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Local Leader near Ishasha 
Sector, Queen Elizabeth NP, 13 April 2017’ (2017); E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Uganda 
People Defense Force (UPDF) Colonel Seconded to ICGLR EJVM, 24 March 2017’ 
(2017).
88  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Uganda Security Oicer, Goma 24 March 2017’ 
(2017); D. Howden, ‘Gorilla Warfare: he Battle to Save One of Africa’s Rarest 
Animals’, he Independent (17 October 2009), available at https://www.independent.
co.uk/environment/nature/gorilla-warfare-the-battle-to-save-one-of-africas-rarest-
animals-1803193.html (last visited 18 March 2020); Verweijen & Marijnen, ‘he 
Counterinsurgency/Conservation Nexus: Guerrilla Livelihoods and the Dynamics of 
Conlict and Violence in the Virunga National Park, Democratic Republic of the Congo’, 
supra note 21, 13, 15.
89  Hsiao, ‘Interview with Village, Kimitoni Village, 14 February 2017’, supra note 87.
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they are sometimes of mixed identity (i.e., Nande, Hunde, and Nyanga tribes).90 
It is diicult to say whether they are protecting or extorting their own local 
communities. Of course, there are numerous Mai-Mai groups, so it is diicult to 
generalize, but it could be said such uses of armed force represent a very maia-
like strategy that coercively reclaims authority once displaced by conservation. 
It is this violent relationship between conservation through PAs and armed 
conlict in the Greater Virunga Landscape that makes conventional State-based 
PAs management more challenging in bello.
he story of conservation induced displacement and resentment towards 
green-grabbing in the Kidepo Landscape is not too diferent. After the Ik’s 
traditional lands were gazetted into Kidepo Valley National Park, they settled 
in a key cattle rustling corridor used by Didinga from the north, Turkana from 
the east, and Karamojong and Jie from the west. he constant inter-raiding left 
them without livestock or crops, crippled economic development, and allegedly 
led the Ik to abandon their sick and elderly during the 1960 famines.91 Today, 
the Ik are considered one of the most destitute and marginalized ethnic groups 
in all of Uganda.92
Luo agriculturalists and agro-pastoral Karamojong sub-groups who 
populate the Kidepo Landscape similarly found themselves on the wrong side of 
park borderlines. Many were displaced or abandoned their lands during decades 
of armed conlict between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Uganda 
People’s Defense Force (UPDF). In their absence, UWA undertook land surveys 
and a boundary demarcation process that was soon challenged.93 When residents 
returned, they found their communal lands and homesteads converted into a 
90  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Messages with a Congolese Conservationist, 6 July 2018’ (2018).
91  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with UWA Community Conservation Warden, Kidepo 
Valley National Park 18 April 2017’ (2017); D. Harmon, ‘Cultural Diversity, Human 
Subsistence, and the National Park Ideal’, 9 Environmental Ethics (1987) 2, 147, 152-153; 
Hart-Davis, ‘Let Us Never Go the Way of the Ik’, supra note 84; C. M. Turnbull, he 
Mountain People (1987).
92  Forest Peoples Programme, United Organisation for Batwa Development in Uganda 
& International Work Group for Indigenous Afairs, ‘Alternative Report to the Second 
Periodic Report of Uganda to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ 
(2009) 23, available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/iles/publication/2010/08/
ugandaachprsupprepmay09eng.pdf (last visited 18 March 2020); B. Okiror, ‘Ugandan 
Tribes Face Extinction’, New Vision (15 November 2008), available at https://www.
newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1176983/ugandan-tribes-extinction (last visited 18 
March 2020).
93  N.N., ‘Interview with AWF Programme Oicer, Karenga 18 Apr 2017’ (2017); M. A. 
Rugadya & H. Kamusiime, ‘Tenure in Mystery: he Status of Land Under Wildlife, 
90 GoJIL 10 (2020) 1, 67-110
national park.94 Rugadya and Kamusiime note that “[…] today the demarcation 
of the gazetted areas is perceived as land grabbing. Even though it was common 
knowledge that much of the land in the region was under protected status [...]”.95 
People knew there was a national park nearby, but did not realize until after its 
boundaries were signposted that their lands were part of it.
Kidepo locals remain skeptical of conservation activities, fearing they will 
lose more land and access to essential livelihood resources and rights of pasture. 
he same skepticism could be applied to the State in general, seeing as how 
the current status of (negative) peace was secured through multiple extremely 
violent disarmament campaigns in villages across the Kidepo Landscape.96 
hese complex connections between PAs and armed conlict, as well as local 
communities and armed groups, require special consideration when designing 
and undertaking conservation in places of conlict. In order to be conlict 
resilient, conservation must be conlict sensitive.
IV. Institutionalizing Transboundary Cooperation
he Greater Virunga Landscape began when Belgians designated Albert 
National Park in 1925 “[…] to protect mountain gorilla populations on the 
boundary between the colonies of Ruanda-Urundi and the Congo”.97 Post-
independence, Albert National Park became Virunga National Park in the DRC 
and Volcanoes National Park in Rwanda. Shortly before that, George Schaller 
and his protégée Dian Fossey initiated mountain gorilla research in 1959.98 In 
Forestry and Mining Concessions in Karmoja Region, Uganda’, 17 Nomadic Peoples 
(2013) 1, 33, 40.
94  P. Carmody & D. Taylor, ‘Globalization, Land Grabbing, and the Present-Day Colonial 
State in Uganda: Ecolonization and Its Impacts’, 25 Journal of Environment & Development 
(2016) 1, 100, 114-116.
95  Rugadya & Kamusiime, ‘Tenure in Mystery: he Status of Land Under Wildlife, Forestry 
and Mining Concessions in Karmoja Region, Uganda’, supra note 93, 40.
96  J. Kerry, ‘he Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act 
of 2009: Report (to Accompany S. 1067)’, Senate Report No. 2, 15 December 2009; K. 
Mkutu, ‘Disarmament in Karamoja, Northern Uganda: Is his a Solution for Localised 
Violent Inter and Intra-Communal Conlict?’, 97 he Round Table (2008) 394, 99, 100-
116; E. Stites & D. Akabwai, ‘‘We Are Now Reduced to Women’: Impacts of Forced 
Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda’, 14 Nomadic Peoples (2010) 2, 24, 24-30.
97  H. van der Linde et al., Beyond Boundaries: A Bibliography on Transboundary Natural 
Resource Management in Sub-Saharan Africa (2001), 3; Vasilijević et al., Transboundary 
Conservation: A Systematic and Integrated Approach, supra note 6, 4.
98  J. Reisch & J. Jenson, ‘Transboundary Collaboration in the Greater Virunga Landscape: 
From Gorilla Conservation to Conlict-Sensitive Transboundary Landscape Management’, 
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1979, a coalition of international NGOs founded the Mountain Gorilla Project, 
based in Rwanda.99 In 1991, they became the International Gorilla Conservation 
Programme (IGCP).100
While IGCP and its partners supported transboundary technical meetings 
in the Virunga Massif, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) observed that 
PA authorities in DRC and Uganda (the ICCN and UWA respectively) were 
informally cooperating in the elephant corridors and savannah lands to the 
north. In 2003, they facilitated a transboundary meeting between PA authorities 
and local governments in the central and northern sectors of Virunga National 
Park and adjacent Ugandan national parks.101 hese PAs collectively formed the 
Central Albertine Rift Transfrontier Conservation Area Network under a 2004 
trilateral MoU between the three countries’ PA authorities.102 Since then, a paper 
trail of agreements (see Table below) at increasingly higher levels of government 
mark a decade of institutional formation and formalization, resulting in the 
Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration (GVTC).
in C. Bruch, C. Mufett & S. S. Nichols (eds), Governance, Natural Resources, and Post 
Conlict Peacebuilding (2016) 825, 5. 
99  M. Gray & E. Rutagarama, 20 Years of IGCP: Lessons Learned in Mountain Gorilla 
Conservation (2011), 5.
100  Reisch & Jenson, ‘Transboundary Collaboration in the Greater Virunga Landscape: From 
Gorilla Conservation to Conlict-Sensitive Transboundary Landscape Management’, 
supra note 98, 5-6.
101  A. J. Plumptre, D. Kujirakwinja & S. Kobusingye, ‘Transboundary Collaboration 
between Virunga Park, Democratic Republic of Congo and Queen Elizabeth, Rwenzori 
and Semuliki Parks, Uganda: Report of Transboundary Meeting 20-21st June 2003’ 
(2003), 3.
102  Oice Rwandais de Tourisme et des Parcs Nationaux, Uganda Wildlife Authority 
& Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature, Trilateral Memorandum 
of Understanding between the Oice Rwandais de Tourisme et Des Parcs Nationaux the 
Uganda Wildlife Authority and the Institut Congolais Pour La Conservation de La Nature 
on the Collaborative Conservation of the Central Albertine Rift Transfrontier Protected Area 
Network (2004), available at http://www.tbpa.net/docs/treaties_MOUs/TRILATERAL_
Central_Albertine_Rift_MOU_2004-Eng.pdf (last visited 18 March 2020).
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Table of GVTC Framework Agreements103:
DATE AGREEMENT SHORT TITLE
9 January 
2004
Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
EHWZHHQ WKH 2൶FH 5ZDQGDLV GH 7RXULVPH
HW GHV 3DUFV 1DWLRQDX[ WKH 8JDQGD :LOGOLIH
$XWKRULW\ DQG WKH ,QVWLWXW &RQJRODLV SRXU OD
&RQVHUYDWLRQGHOD1DWXUHRQWKH&ROODERUDWLYH
&RQVHUYDWLRQ RI WKH &HQWUDO $OEHUWLQH 5LIW
7UDQVIURQWLHU3URWHFWHG$UHD1HWZRUN
2004 Trilateral 
MoU
14 October 
2005
Tripartite Ministerial Declaration of Goma on the 
Transboundary Natural Resources Management 
of the Transfrontier Protected Area Network of 
the Greater Virunga landscape
2005 Ministerial 
Declaration
28 May 2006 Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Uganda Wildlife Authority, UWA, 
the Oice Rwandais de Tourisme et des Parcs 
Nationaux, ORTPN, and the Institut Congolais 
Pour La Conservation de la Nature, ICCN, on 
the Collaborative Monitoring of and Sharing 
Revenues from Transfrontier Tourism Gorilla 
Groups
2006 Re-
venue-Sharing 
MoU
15 July 2008 he Rubavu Ministerial Declaration for the 
Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration
2008 Rubavu 
Declaration
6 February 
2009
Minute of the Inter-Ministerial Board Relating 
to the Institutionalization of the Greater Virunga 
Transboundary Collaboration
2009 Board Mi-
nutes
December 
2013
Headquarters Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the 
Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration 
GVTC
2013 Headquar-
ters Agreement
14 May 2014 Memorandum of Understanding between 
International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region (ICGLR) and the Economic Community 
of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) and 
Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration 
(GVTC)
2014 MoU bet-
ween ICGLR, 
CEPGL, and 
GVTC
103  he respective references can be found in the annex to this article.
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DATE AGREEMENT SHORT TITLE
30 October 
2015
Treaty on the Greater Virunga Transboundary 
Collaboration on Wildlife Conservation and 
Tourism Development
2015 GVTC 
Treaty
GVTC began as a cooperation mechanism among NGO-supported 
PAs and turned into inter-ministerial cooperation through an inter-ministerial 
Board, national secondments to a Kigali-based GVTC Executive Secretariat, 
and spread to other areas of government, including inance, through a revenue-
sharing scheme, and security forces. Diferent levels of institutional alliance 
allow for cooperation through diferent channels (see diagram below).
Interventions are designed to occur primarily at the Implementation and 
Technical levels, involving the GVTC Executive Secretariat, PA authorities, 
and a number of NGO or research organizations that form Regional Technical 
Committees (RTC). When appropriate, conlict issues may be raised to the GVTC 
Board, Council, or Summit. his happened when accusations of kidnappings, 
armed robberies, and military incursions along the contested Sarambwe border 
plagued Bwindi and Sarambwe National Parks as well as adjacent communities 
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in Uganda and DRC respectively.104 A fact-inding mission and meetings 
between PA authorities, local authorities, and the military were facilitated by 
GVTC’s Executive Secretariat, resulting in improved communication between 
national armies (FARDC and UPDF) and ameliorated suspicions of military 
trespass.105
Transboundary meetings led to Board resolutions calling on relevant 
Ministers to address border conlicts, not only in Sarambwe but also along 
other areas of common concern (e.g., Kagezi, Lake Edward) within the Greater 
Virunga Landscape.106 Open communication between the national armies also 
facilitated joint operations with UPDF and UWA on the Uganda-side of Sabinyo 
when the trinational volcano was occupied by the Congolese rebel group, March 
23 Movement (M23), and over 100 alleged rebels were arrested by the UPDF 
while attempting to cross from refugee camps in Uganda back to DRC through 
the national park in late January 2017.107 his demonstrates the environmental 
peacebuilding potential of transboundary conservation in bello and yet it is 
unclear whether this kind of military involvement constitutes a breach of Draft 
Principle 17 protected zone status.
Transboundary conservation in the Kidepo Landscape has a much shorter 
history than in the Greater Virunga Landscape. here was some informal 
cross-border collaboration when South Sudan was still a part of Sudan, but 
that is not well-documented and likely ceased during various conlict years. In 
2005, a USAID-funded WCS report on “he Impact of Conlict in Northern 
Uganda on the Environment and Natural Resource Management”, identiied 
104  A. Meder (ed.), ‘Sarambwe Reserve: Current Developments and hreats’, 51 Gorilla 
Journal (2015) 9.
105  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with UPDF Brigade Commander, Kihihi April 11, 2017’ 
(2017); J. Byamukama & I. Ochen Ochen, Sarambwe Habitat Degradation and Other 
Transboundary International Porous Border Conlicts hreatenin Sustainable Conservation 
and Tourism Development in Greater Virunga Landscape Between Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Uganda, GVTC-Board (2016), iv, 2.
106  Ibid.; Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration, ‘Round Table on Dialogue Between 
State Partners of DRC and Uganda on Wildlife Conservation and Development in the 
Greater Virunga Landscape (Security Group)’ (2017) (on ile with author and GVTC 
Secretariat); P. Mateke, S. E. F. Lutaichirwa Mulwahale & G. Muamba Tshibasu, ‘Report 
on the Cross Border Bilateral Meeting Between Ugandan South Western Border Districts 
of Kisoro, Kanungu, Rukungiri, Rubirizi, Kasese, Bundibugyo and Ntoroko and the 
North Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2017) (on ile with 
author and GVTC Secretariat) 11.
107  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with UWA Chief Warden, Mgahinga Gorilla National Park on 
April 2017’ (2017).
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three potential peace parks in the Imatong Massif, Greater Kidepo, and Otzi-
Nimule.108 Between 2007 and 2010, WCS in partnership with UWA conducted 
aerial surveys to determine what wildlife was left after the war.109 hey found 
that, with conlict-displaced people moving towards roads, urban centers, 
and military outposts, vegetation had regenerated and recovered to pre-war 
conditions over the previous 25 years.110
As part of a broader strategy to rebuild the PA system in South Sudan and 
integrate them into a post-conlict nation-building and development strategy, 
WCS supported dialogues between the nascent Government of South Sudan and 
the Government of Uganda, resulting in the 2007 MoU “On the Management 
of Transboundary Conservation Landscapes for Peace”.111 he 2007 MoU 
called for the establishment of an Inter-governmental Steering Committee 
and Site Technical Committees to operationalize the MoU. Transboundary 
collaboration was to “[…] deliberately support conlict resolution and promote 
peace and stability in the border areas […] to establish dialogue, build trust and 
conidence between our peoples”.112 hat same year, South Sudan and Uganda 
signed a bilateral “Agreement on Technical, Economic, Political, Social and 
Cultural Cooperation”, indicating that relations between the newly independent 
State and its southern ally were strong.113
In 2009, WCS received a USAID grant to implement a transboundary 
program.114 According to UWA, there were cross-border visits and coordinated 
patrols up to 2014, but these diminished and became largely one-way visits of 
the South Sudanese going to Uganda and then none at all.115 In 2014, WCS’ 
108  S. Nampindo, G. Picton Phillipps & A. Plumptre, he Impact of Conlict in Northern 
Uganda on the Environment and Natural Resource Management (2005), 42-44.
109  United Nations Development Programme, Launching Protected Area Network Management 
and Building Capacity in Post-Conlict Southern Sudan, supra note 79, ii.
110  Hsiao, ‘Interview with WCS Uganda, Country Director, Kampala, Uganda 7 December 
2016’, supra note 72.
111  Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Southern Sudan and the 
Government of Uganda On the Management of Transboundary Conservation Landscapes for 
Peace, supra note 78 (on ile with author and the WCS Uganda).
112  Ibid., Art. 3, 9.
113  Discussed in G. Carrington, Cross-Border Trade: Fuelling Conlict or Building Peace? An 
Exploration of Cross-Border Trade Between Sudan and Uganda and the Implications for 
Peacebuilding (2009), 14.
114  Hsiao, ‘Interview with WCS Uganda, Country Director, Kampala, Uganda 7 December 
2016’, supra note 72.
115   Hsiao, ‘Interview with UWA Community Conservation Warden, Kidepo Valley National 
Park 18 April 2017’, supra note 91.
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transboundary program funding ended, leaving coordination of cross-border 
activities to the States. Instead of supporting rangers in the park when armed 
conlict resurged shortly after, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
took over Kidepo Wildlife Reserve in South Sudan, potentially breaching its 
protected zone status.116 With peace in northern Uganda, UWA is eager to 
work with their South Sudanese counterparts in protecting big game species 
(especially elephants) as they migrate seasonally out of Ugandan protection and 
into armed conlict zones in the north.117 he Kidepo Valley National Park Law 
Enforcement Warden remarked that: “We have the will to do it. he other side, 
they’re not in a position to do it, just because of the insecurity that is there.”118 
he 2007 MoU on Landscapes for Peace could become a well-intentioned 
corridor of ‘paper parks’.
hese two case studies highlight important issues regarding the 
operationalization of in bello protection and the fragility of protected zone 
status, which states will need to consider as they inalize and operationalize 
the Draft Principles. Both TBPAs constitute areas of major environmental and 
cultural importance “[…] susceptible to the adverse consequences of hostilities 
[…]” – exactly the kind of places that should be designated protected zones.119 
Both are international PAs designated by agreement(s) that refer speciically to 
conlict resolution and environmental peacebuilding, and thus should constitute 
protected zones with “enhanced protection” under Draft Principle 17.120 Yet 
both continue to sufer from armed conlicts. In the Kidepo Landscape, the 
agreement has stalemated and, in both TBPAs, Draft Principle 17 protection 
in bello could be breached. hus far, it is uncertain whether the ILC Draft 
Principles will be able to protect such places from the adverse consequences of 
armed conlict.
116  Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, 260, 
Draft Principle 17(3).
117  Hsiao, ‘Interview with UWA Community Conservation Warden, Kidepo Valley National 
Park 18 April 2017’, supra note 91.
118  Hsiao, ‘Interview with UWA Law Enforcement Warden, 18 April 2017’ (2017).
119  Report of the International Law Commission to the Seventy-First Session, supra note 4, 222, 
Principle 4(3).
120  Ibid., 260, Draft Principle 17(2).
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D. Lessons in Sustaining Transboundary Conservation in  
 Places of Armed Conlict
After the Rwandan genocide, Plumptre conducted a survey of PA staf 
who stayed on in Volcanoes National Park and Nyungwe National Park (part 
of another TBPA on the Burundi-Rwanda border), “[…] despite the loss of 
all senior staf, the suspension of regular salaries, and threats to their lives”.121 
He identiied the following elements as key to sustaining conservation during 
armed conlict: (1) commitment of junior staf, (2) maintained presence of 
long-term projects with funding, (3) care for employees (including families 
of murdered staf), (4) good communication with the capital and safe zones, 
and (5) education of local communities.122 Field research and interviews in the 
Greater Virunga Landscape and Kidepo Landscape airm the importance of 
maintaining activities and projects (which rely on sustained resourcing, both 
human and material), inclusive partnership (including with and beyond security 
organs), and education or awareness-raising in local communities, but emphasize 
that conlict sensitivity must be incorporated across the board. It is not suicient 
solely to sustain cooperation if it is aggravating root causes or social conlicts 
linked to armed conlict.
I. Engaging the Security Sector
One of the great achievements and risks of transboundary conservation 
is engagement with the security sector. In the Greater Virunga Landscape, 
cooperation with security organs, ranging from the military to judiciary, has 
played an increasing role in protecting the constituent PAs from the harmful 
impacts of armed conlicts in the region. In 2018, a communiqué resulting 
from a roundtable dialogue facilitated by the GVTC Executive Secretariat on 
wildlife conservation and development between DRC and Uganda committed 
to establish a “[…] permanent framework for communication and information 
sharing between local administrative entities and security authorities […]” 
institutionalizing the conservation-security nexus.123 
121  Plumptre, ‘Lessons Learned from On-the-Ground Conservation in Rwanda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’, supra note 5, 69.
122  Ibid., 85.
123  S. E. F. Lutaichirwa Mulwahale, H. S. Sekandi & G. Muamba Tshibasu, Round Table 
on Dialogue Between State Partners of DRC and Uganda on Wildlife Conservation and 
Development in the Greater Virunga Landscape (Communique), 28 June 2017 (on ile with 
author and GVTC Secretariat).
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In the Greater Virunga Landscape, national security cooperation extends 
to other regional bodies. GVTC’s partnership with ICGLR has helped unify 
security cooperation by facilitating otherwise logistically complicated (and 
potentially controversial) border crossings of military personnel.124 he East 
African Community (EAC) participated in GVTC eforts towards legal 
harmonization of wildlife crimes and is in the process of developing a regional 
wildlife policy that could address illicit activities linked to armed groups in the 
PAs.125 In October 2018, the GVTC Executive Secretariat hosted a conference 
on peace and security that emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation to 
address causes and impacts of violent conlict in coordination with the UN and 
other peace and development programs in the landscape.126
During the January 2017 Law Enforcement Regional Technical 
Committee meeting in Goma that I attended as an observer, the group of 
military oicers, police, customs agents, judiciary, and PA wardens from the 
three countries determined their irst priority is ‘Peace and Security’ and then 
proceeded to outline a series of activities along with each of their responsibilities 
towards securing that common goal.127 he Chief Park Warden of Volcanoes 
National Park (Rwanda) attributed this broadened inclusivity to the signing of 
the Treaty:
“But, you know, engaging people is the most useful, productive 
approach and without the treaty you can’t achieve it easily, 
because bringing onboard these institutions is very diicult... the 
legal framework is very, very important. […] here’s no meeting 
as wardens without police, without the army, without customs, 
because… we need them, more than they need us.”128
124  Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration, International Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region & Economic Community of Great Lake Countries, Memorandum of 
Understanding Between International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the 
Economic Community of Great Lake Countries (CEPGL) and Greater Virunga Transboundary 
Collaboration (GVTC), 81-103; Hsiao, ‘Interview with UPDF Colonel Seconded to 
ICGLR EJVM, 24 March 2017’, supra note 87.
125  GVTC, Concept Note on Harmonization of Wildlife Crime Related Policies and Laws in GVL 
Stakeholders Meeting, 2017 (on ile with author and GVTC Secretariat).
126  CGVTC Secretariat, Coalition Building Conference for Peace and Security and Shared 
Natural Resources Management in the Greater Virunga Landscape: Concept Note, 2018 (on 
ile with author and GVTC Secretariat).
127  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Chief Park Warden, Volcanoes National Park, Kinigi, 
Rwanda’ (2017).
128  Ibid.
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his provides some attestation to the importance of formalizing 
mechanisms of inclusion for other stakeholders in transboundary conservation 
through multilateral agreements and the need for diverse partnerships and 
security coordination. Conservation-security partnerships in places of armed 
conlict must be undertaken with great awareness. One researcher describes the 
European Commission’s armament and training of Virunga National Park ranger 
forces in fulilment of UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions as a 
threat to post-conlict peace.129 Dufy and others question whether conservation 
should be inancing more guns in an already violent landscape and speak to fears 
shared by other academics that green militarization undermines just and stable 
peace.130 his is certainly the case when ranger forces are implicated in wildlife 
crimes or human rights abuses.131
he danger of green militarization in the Greater Virunga Landscape is 
not just about further antagonizing communities, it is also about ‘sleeping with 
the enemy.’ In the Kidepo Landscape, after South Sudanese PA authorities led, 
UWA tried to collaborate with the SPLA stationed in and around the park, but 
the army was not interested in wildlife protection.132 hey have been linked 
to ivory and resource traicking out of the Kidepo Wildlife Reserve, much 
like how the UN mission in DRC (MONUSCO) was caught traicking ivory 
and minerals from Virunga National Park.133 When elements of the UN, the 
129  B. Sjöstedt, ‘Environmental Governance and Peacebuilding as a Joint Enterprise’, in 
Protecting Nature in Conlicts & Building Peace: Success Stories in Conlicts & heir Aftermath, 
Paper Presented to 15th Annual Colloquium of the IUCN Academy of Environmental 
Law, Cebu, 29 May - 2 June 2017 (2017), 12 (on ile with B. Sjöjstedt).
130  Dufy et al., ‘Why We Must Question the Militarisation of Conservation’, supra note 21.
131  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Local Leader near Bwindi Impenetrable NP on 16 January 
2017’ (2017); T. Warren & K. J. M. Baker, ‘WWF’s Secret War’, BuzzFeed News (2019), 
available at https://www.buzzfeednews.com/collection/wwfsecretwar (last visited 19 
March 2020).
132  J. Delaney & S. Sautner, ‘Deep Concern for South Sudan’s Natural Resources – an 
Emerging Illegal Exploitation and Traicking Crisis’, WCS News Release (2 March 
2016), available at https://newsroom.wcs.org/News-Releases/articleType/ArticleView/
articleId/8603/Deep-Concern-for-South-Sudans-Natural-Resources-an-Emerging-
Illegal-Exploitation-and-Traicking-Crisis.aspx (last visited 19 March 2020); C. Doki, 
‘South Sudan’s Wildlife Become Casualties Of War and Are Killed to Feed Soldiers and 
Rebels’, Inter Press Service (17 June 2014), available at http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/
south-sudans-wildlife-become-casualties-war-killed-feed-soldiers-rebels/ (last visited 19 
March 2020).
133  Hsiao, ‘Interview with Congolese Conservationist, Goma 16 Feb 2017’, supra note 67; 
E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with UWA Community Conservation Ranger, Kidepo Valley 
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national armies, or other (security) partners are compromised, engagement must 
implement safeguards, transparency, accountability, and conlict sensitivity or 
the credibility of transboundary institution(s) can be sacriiced.134 Militarization 
or military engagement in TBPAs may be necessary to respond to armed 
groups and ensure conservation in bello, but conlict sensitivity and long-term 
peacebuilding may require alternative approaches.
II. Reaching Out to Other Partners for Conservation
PA authorities are not neutral actors in a landscape. During a border 
visit in May 2017, I was advised that ield interviews with an UWA escort in 
South Sudan would not be safe given recent arrests by UWA of a number of 
poachers from border-adjacent villages.135 he local Catholic priest suggested 
that I accompany him instead, as his clerical garb serves as a well-accepted cloak 
of neutrality on the other side of the border. his comment reiterates the risk 
of alienation when allying with paramilitary/security forces and highlights the 
value of working with non-conventional conservation allies to link human and 
environmental needs during armed conlict.
Without a PA counterpart and little success in partnering with the military 
in South Sudan, UWA has piggybacked on local peace processes facilitated 
by the Catholic Diocese.136 In May 2017, the Catholic Diocese held a youth 
dialogue, bringing approximately 50 young people from Birra, Lotukei, and 
Mening in South Sudan to Karenga, Uganda where the Kidepo Valley National 
Park headquarters is based.137 UWA staf spoke to the youth during this two-day 
event about the importance of wildlife for post-conlict peace and the beneits of 
National Park’ (2017).
134  H. Dranginis, ‘Grand heft Global: Prosecuting the War Crime of Natural Resource 
Pillage in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (2015), 3, 17, available at http://www.
satsentinel.org/sites/default/iles/reports/GrandheftGlobal-PillageReport-Dranginis-
Enough-Jan2015.pdf (last visited 19 March 2020); H. Dranginis, ‘he Maia in the Park: 
A Charcoal Syndicate Is hreatening Virunga, Africa’s Oldest National Park’ (2016), 
45, available at https://enoughproject.org/iles/report_MaiaInhePark_Dranginis_
Enough_June2016.pdf (last visited 19 March 2020).
135  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Communications with UWA Community Conservation Ranger, Kidepo 
Valley National Park, 18-20 April 2017’ (2017).
136  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Father Raphael Lobeerei, Kidepo Valley National Park 19 
April 2017’ (2017).
137  Hsiao, ‘Interview with UWA Community Conservation Warden, Kidepo Valley National 
Park 18 April 2017’ (2017), supra note 91; Ibid.
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cross-border conservation, and then toured them around the park to witness the 
revenue potential of abundant wildlife and post-conlict tourism.138
Plumptre’s study indicates these eforts in environmental education 
are critical to supporting rangers in continuing their work during armed 
conlict.139 Unfortunately, environmental education and awareness-raising is not 
contemplated at all in the ILC Draft Principles, nor is it mentioned in most TBPA 
agreements.140 In the Greater Virunga Landscape, there is only generic reference 
to the promotion of biodiversity conservation.141 here is no direction as to the 
kind of environmental education that can be most meaningful for communities 
inhabiting these landscapes or more efective towards engaging them in ongoing 
support for PAs during armed conlict. his non-violent approach to securing 
PAs in bello needs further research.
III. Bottom-up vs. Top-down Approaches to TBPA Design
While internationally designated PAs are encouraged by the ILC Draft 
Principles, it is worth questioning whether the top-down approach of designation 
by States or international organizations is conducive to their sustained protection 
and peacebuilding potential during times of armed conlict. Both the TBPAs in 
this study started with an MoU, but the Greater Virunga Landscape was more 
of a bottom-up approach beginning with PA authorities attempting to formalize 
support for existing activities on the ground. he Landscapes for Peace MoU 
between corresponding Ministers of Environment on behalf of their respective 
governments took a higher-level approach. here are advantages and disadvantages 
to diferent levels of entry in TBPA designations. he Greater Virunga approach 
was deemed appropriate by its early proponents because relations were poor 
between the central governments.142 A more top-down approach works when 
relations between higher-levels of government are stronger, as between South 
138  E. C. Hsiao, ‘E-Mails from Kidepo Valley National Park Community Conservation 
Warden’ (2017).
139  Plumptre, ‘Lessons Learned from On-the-Ground Conservation in Rwanda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’, supra note 5, 85.
140  Hsiao, Protecting Places for Nature, People, and Peace: A Critical Socio-Legal Review of 
Transboundary Conservation Areas, supra note 8, 158.
141  Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Rwanda and Republic of Uganda, Greater 
Virunga Transboundary Collaboration Treaty on Wildlife Conservation and Tourism 
Development (GVTCT), supra note 35, Art. 6(1).
142  A. Martin et al., ‘Understanding the Co-Existence of Conlict and Cooperation: 
Transboundary Ecosystem Management in the Virunga Massif ’, 48 Journal of Peace 
Research (2011) 5, 621, 626-630.
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Sudan and Uganda. As Brock says, “[…] ecological cooperation is a dependent 
variable that relects the state of overall relations more than it inluences the 
relations”.143
According to John Hanks, the irst Chief Executive Oicer of the Peace 
Parks Foundation in Southern Africa, “[…] if you can have this high level 
of political support, it deinitely makes a diference in getting things up and 
running”.144 Adding support to Hanks’ observation of the value of high-level 
collaborations, Schoon notes that, in the Greater Limpopo, “[…] the top-down 
emergence of the transboundary park has resulted in a high degree of success 
in the achievement of goals requiring senior government oicials and crossing 
a breadth of governmental ministries […]”.145 He also observed that “[…] the 
bottom-up genesis of a transboundary park results in more collaborative responses 
at an operational level than a top-down origination”, which in turn, he posits 
supports greater institutional resilience.146 In other words, TBPAs initiated at a 
political level are better at dealing with high-level matters and TBPAs initiated 
at the technical level are better at maintaining operations throughout changing 
circumstances.
Hanks also notes that, once the green light is given by the Heads of State, 
it is imperative that other levels of government push forward operationalizing 
cooperation. High-level arrangements may not transfer to operations on the 
ground though, and this is critical for PAs experiencing armed conlict. In 
the Landscapes for Peace, initial high-level meetings were held until 2011, but 
according to WCS, “[…] these did not really quickly translate into real action on 
the ground, seeing rangers on the other side coming to Uganda or rangers from 
this side going to the other side […]”.147 If transboundary conservation relies 
only on high-level institutions to cooperate, it can become inefective in bello.
Schoon hypothesizes that institutional design at the outset of collaboration 
can determine path dependence for institutional resilience, meaning the 
Landscapes for Peace initiative may have been inappropriately designed. Given 
the fragility of peace in the region, a more bottom-up approach would provide a 
baseline of operational cooperation that, if bolstered by Plumptre’s suggestions, 
143  L. Brock, ‘Peace hrough Parks: he Environment on the Peace Research Agenda’, 28 
Journal of Peace Research (1991) 4, 407, 414.
144  E. C. Hsiao, Interview with John Hanks, First CEO of Peace Parks Foundation (2017).
145  M. Schoon, ‘Governance in Transboundary Conservation: How Institutional Structure 
and Path Dependence Matter’, 11 Conservation and Society (2013) 4, 420, 426.
146  Ibid., 425.
147  Hsiao, ‘Interview with WCS Uganda, Country Director, Kampala, Uganda 7 December 
2016’, supra note 72.
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might produce a pathway of greater (conlict) resilience. Alternatively, the 
Landscapes for Peace initiative could build on a long history of peacemaking 
and biocultural connectivity by agro-pastoral communities moving across its 
borders to establish a community-governed TBPA or Transboundary ICCA. In 
the Kidepo Landscape speciically, this would draw on the authority of non-State 
actors in the Karenga Community Conservation Area adjacent to Kidepo Valley 
National Park, where most of the wildlife ranges seasonally and the border is 
more porous to local communities than it is to UWA staf. Furthermore, despite 
all their inter-raiding, these communities share common peacemaking practices 
that endure today.148
“We try […] to resolve the clan issues by bringing back the elders 
together and they talk together. Some Karamojong, they come, 
they say ‘we are killing ourselves, these things have brought us 
bad omen.’ So there are some of these places that people have been 
going for these kind of, what people call kalongat. hey go there 
sometimes to pray, to possibly take away some bad happenings 
within the society.”149
he cultural authority of elders extends to environmental management:
“Well, in one way or another, in terms of environmental protection, 
the shrines and the authority of the elders was actually more holding. 
Look, for example, this area that we are sitting in. his area could 
be bare by now. here wouldn’t be there any of these trees. It used 
to be clean, but far back ’95, ’96, ’91, the elders sat and said, […] 
‘We should not cut these trees. Let’s leave them.’ […] So it was done 
and that’s why these small things are surviving, otherwise by now 
we’d have stones rolling because it was really terrible by then. here 
would be complete erosion.”150
148  E. C. Hsiao, ‘Interview with Peter Abach, Local Councilman (LC3), Karenga 19 April 
2017’ (2017); Oryema, ‘Communications with UWA Community Conservation Ranger, 
Kidepo Valley National Park, 18-20 April 2017’. 
149  Hsiao, ‘Interview with Peter Abach, Local Councilman (LC3), Karenga 19 April 2017’, 
supra note 148. 
150  Ibid.
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According to a local leader, the communities have been maintaining peace 
dialogues since 1998, developing their own version of the GVTC’s multi-level, 
multi-institutional transboundary structure to draw upon.
“Diferent actors, we started as local government. We brought up 
local development partners. We had organizations like the church 
also contributed, the Catholic Church […] and many others that 
I cannot mention, both in South Sudan and here. But we were all 
trying to mitigate the conlict and we have been able to mitigate at 
State level with State Ministers, at the county levels with county 
leadership and at karaal level with karaal leaders. We had all those 
interventions, even had the youth at the church level and had some 
exchanges about the youth across the borders.”151
A greening of the existing peace dialogues could address root causes of 
armed conlict, providing an interesting twist on environmental peacebuilding 
that is typically premised on a converse causal relationship whereby environmental 
cooperation strengthens human or inter-state relations and dialogue options for 
peace. he agro-pastoral conlicts of Karamoja are “[…] inluenced by climatic 
variations and consequent drought and food crises […]”, made worse by 
environmental degradation deteriorating agricultural productivity.152 Instead, 
inter-clan protected zone designations would be a peace process in and of itself, 
paving the way back to environmental cooperation and socio-ecological well-
being. Stemming from the self-determination of indigenous or traditional 
systems, it should create a greater sense of ownership and thus enhance local 
eforts to protect protected zones from armed conlict.
TBPA agreements are rarely negotiated between or with non-state partners. 
A few exceptions are: (1) the Bjeshkët e Namuna/Prokletije Mountains TBPA 
between Albania and Montenegro, which is a cooperation between Local Action 
Groups; (2) the Balkan Transboundary Peace Park initiative between Albania, 
Montenegro, and Kosovo, which is represented by a coalition of civil society and 
local authorities; and (3) the Nawt-sa-Maat Alliance for the Salish Seas between 
151  Ibid.
152  L. MacOpiyo, Pastoralists’ Livelihoods in the Kidepo Valley Area of Northern Uganda: A Desk 
Review of the Prevailing Livelihood Strategies Development Environment and State of Resource 
Management in the Kidepo Valley Area and Its Environment (2011), 22.
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Canada and the US by an alliance of First Nations.153 It is more common for PAs 
authorities, who are signatories to TBPA agreements, to sign subsequent MoUs 
with community organizations or groups for resource-use, PA access, human-
wildlife conlict interventions, etc. In the Kidepo Landscape, UWA could enter 
into MoUs with local leaders and partners to formalize existing transboundary 
peace processes under the Intergovernmental Steering Committee and Site 
Technical Committees called for by the 2007 MoU.154 his would revitalize 
the existing transboundary agreement, operationalize functional systems of 
environmental peacebuilding, and potentially recalibrate the institutional 
pathway for conlict resilience. hese endogenous processes may prove more 
efective for environmental protection in times of armed conlict, making non-
State designations of protected zones especially important under the ILC Draft 
Principles.
Community approaches have their advantages. Research in Nepal has 
shown that strong community governance of natural resources improves both 
community resistance and forest resilience to occupation by armed insurgents.155 
In contrast, green militarization risks breaching Draft Principle 17’s in bello 
protection. Although GVTC’s partnership with ICGLR and CEPGL institutes 
a multi-prong approach to peace, through traditional security and economic 
development, respectively, the economic approach to peace or liberal peace has 
its critics, as do neoliberal approaches to conservation.156 hese case studies 
153  Local Action Group (LAG) of Albania and LAG of Montenegro, Memorandum of 
Understanding Between he Local Action Group (LAG) of Albania and he Local Action 
Group (LAG) of Montenegro Concerning Cooperation in Environmental Protection, Tourism, 
Recreation and Sustainable Development in the Territories of the Two Communities Either 
Side of the International Border between Albania and Montenegro in the Bjeshkët e Namuna/
Prokletije Mountains, and Local Authorities of Municipalities/Districts of Shkodra, Bajram 
Curri, Plava, Rozaje, Peja and Decani, Letter of Good Intent for Cross-Border Local Authorities 
of Albania, Montenegro and Kosov’, 15 November 2006, available at https://www.iucn.org/
sites/dev/iles/import/downloads/lags_alb_mne_mou.pdf (last visited 16 April 2020); 
International Treaty to Protect the Salish Sea, 21 September 2014.
154  Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Southern Sudan and the 
Government of Uganda On the Management of Transboundary Conservation Landscapes for 
Peace (on ile with author and WCS Uganda), supra note 78, Art. 3.
155  N. Baral, Institutional Resilience of Community-Based Conservation to the Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal (2009) 103; B. K. Karna, G. P. Shivakoti & E. L. Webb, ‘Resilience of Community 
Forestry under Conditions of Armed Conlict in Nepal’, 37 Environmental Conservation 
(2010) 2, 201, 201-209.
156  B. Büscher, Transforming the Frontier: Peace Parks and the Politics of Neoliberal Conservation 
in Southern Africa (2013) 17, 28-31; C. F. Gelpi & J. M. Grieco, ‘Democracy, 
Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace’, 45 Journal of Peace Research (2008) 
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emphasize the importance of conlict sensitivity for conlict resilience. It is critical 
to support what works on the ground, including traditional and indigenous 
institutions and peace processes that ofer non-coercive alternatives.
E. Conclusion
he Greater Virunga Landscape and Kidepo Landscape are unique and 
intertwined in many ways. heir experiences in developing legal frameworks 
for transboundary conservation and institutionalizing cross-border cooperation 
amidst armed conlict provide a number of lessons as well as questions. On 
Uganda’s western border, expanding partnerships, including with the security 
sector, have facilitated in bello conservation in the Greater Virunga Landscape. 
he growing population of mountain gorillas is considered an indicator of its 
success.157 On Uganda’s northern border, armed conlict and lack of resources 
has hindered intergovernmental cooperation in the Kidepo Landscape, 
so more endogenous alternatives have emerged. Ongoing peace dialogues 
between traditional communities hosted by a faith-based institution provide an 
opportunity to reformulate transboundary institutional design in keeping with 
its original transboundary agreement.
Where armed conlict plagues TBPAs, it is important to sustain PA-
level support designed for conlict resilience and conlict sensitivity, and then 
to recognize these collaborations through agreements that provide longer-term 
stability to their ongoing eforts. It is especially critical for PA authorities to 
engage existing peace mechanisms and actors (whether security forces or cultural 
leaders) so that TBPAs can experience enhanced protection during armed 
conlict. Engagement with the security sector or even armed groups may be 
necessary but needs to be sensitive of any contribution to violent conlict, long-
standing injustices, or human rights violations. It is also critical that military 
activities in PAs do not breach Draft Principle 17 protected zone status. he ILC 
Draft Principles should clarify rules of engagement with armed groups and how 
protected zones should be protected under occupation, without stripping away 
in bello protection. It is exactly these kinds of PAs that most require protection in 
relation to armed conlict and this may require interaction with armed groups.
1, 17; See for an in-depth discussion, N. Heynen et al. (eds), Neoliberal Environments: False 
Promises and Unnatural Consequences (2007).
157  J. R. Hickey et al., ‘Bwindi-Sarambwe 2018 Surveys: Monitoring Mountain Gorillas, Other 
Select Mammals, and Human Activities’ (2019), 5, available at http://igcp.org/wp-content/
uploads/Bwindi-Sarambwe-2018-Final-Report-2019_12_15.pdf (last visited 19 March 
2020].
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An alternative to militarization is increasing local participation. While 
cooperation between PA authorities in the Greater Virunga Landscape was 
initially the backbone of cross-border conservation, it is their alliance with other 
actors, especially NGOs and regional institutions, that enables their persistence 
in the landscape. In the case of Kidepo, other partners means traditional leaders 
or elders and religious groups. It is not clear whether such actors (including 
indigenous peoples) acting alone can designate protected zones and, as a norm 
of practice, they rarely participate in TBPA agreements as signatories. Instead, 
they can be brought in through inter-institutional agreements or as members of 
transboundary institutions. his puts environmental governance in the hands 
of local actors with a direct stake in the armed conlict impacting the TBPA. It 
also commits more stakeholders to the protection of PAs in bello.
Protecting PAs in bello provides some reprieve for conlict-alicted 
wildlife in violent borderlands and migratory corridors that span States. When 
transboundary collaboration was diicult in the Greater Virunga Landscape due 
to insecurity, a wildlife refuge was the best that the PA authorities could try to 
maintain.158 his illustrates the importance of protected zones for the protection 
of natural environments in relation to armed conlict. he ILC Draft Principles 
provide for protected zones of major environmental and cultural importance. 
his includes, inter alia, World Heritage Sites, some nationally designated PAs, 
and internationally protected areas or TBPAs. For TBPAs to be recognized as 
protected zones during armed conlict, they must be designated by agreement, 
and the agreement should not be materially breached in bello. If a TBPA agreement 
is to remain in good standing, it requires sustained cooperation towards PAs 
conservation and possibly even towards conlict resolution. When applying the 
ILC Draft Principles, states should consider a progressive interpretation of Draft 
Principle 17, incorporating all protected and conserved areas regardless of how 
they are designated (by agreement or otherwise).
It is one thing to designate and white-lag a PA and another to actually 
protect it from the day-to-day impacts of ongoing armed conlicts. his article 
provides examples from two TBPAs that have tried to maintain transboundary 
conservation during armed conlict when circumstances are uniquely challenging. 
hese case studies demonstrate that a bottom-up approach to both international 
158  Kalpers, Volcanoes Under Siege: Impact of a Decade of Armed Conlict in the Virungas, supra 
note 31, 20-21; Kanyamibwa, ‘Impact of War on Conservation: Rwandan Environment 
and Wildlife in Agony’, supra note 31, 1399-1405, supra note 31; Plumptre, Masozera & 
Vedder, he Impact of Civil War on the Conservation of Protected Areas in Rwanda, supra 
note 31.
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designations and transboundary institutional design are important for conlict 
resilience or sustained protection in bello. It is critical to engage with a diversity 
of stakeholders, including non-State and non-conservation actors, and this may 
necessitate engagement with armed groups. In such cases, engagement should be 
conlict sensitive and ensure that it does not breach protected zone status. hese 
lessons may help other TBPAs seeking to design conlict resilient and conlict 
sensitive transboundary cooperation. Similarly, these lessons can be applied to 
any protected zone or natural environment struggling for protection against the 
impacts of armed conlict. Hopefully, this article can inform ongoing debates on 
the ILC Draft Principles on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conlict so that they can be most efective when most needed.
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